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LONG TERM EXPOSURE TO ASBESTOS SATISFIES TEST FOR CAUSATION 
Background 
In Booth v Amaca Pty Ltd and Amaba Pty Ltd,1 the New South Wales Dust Diseases Tribunal awarded 
a retired motor mechanic $326 640 in damages for his malignant pleural mesothelioma allegedly 
caused by exposure to asbestos through working with the brake linings manufactured by the 
defendants.   
 
The evidence before the Tribunal was that the plaintiff had been exposed to asbestos prior to 
working as a mechanic from home renovations when he was a child and loading a truck as a youth.  
However, as a mechanic he had been exposed to asbestos in brake linings on which he worked from 
1953 to 1983.  Curtis DCJ held at [172] that the asbestos from the brake linings ‘materially 
contributed to [the plaintiff’s] contraction of mesothelioma’.  This decision was based upon 
acceptance that the effect of exposure to asbestos on the development of mesothelioma was 
cumulative and rejection of theory that a single fibre of asbestos can cause the disease. 
 
On appeal it was argued that the evidence did not provide the basis for the judge’s decision on 
causation.2  Basten JA, with whom Beazley and Giles JAA agreed, stated that the test for causation in 
general terms was ‘no more than whether or not the respondent [Booth] established on the balance 
of probabilities that, in respect of each appellant, exposure to inhalation of asbestos liberated from 
its products materially contributed to his injury.’3  His Honour held that the evidence before the trial 
court, tested and accepted scientific theory and epidemiological evidence, was capable of 
supporting a finding of causation.  The appeal was dismissed. 
 
Special leave was granted by the High Court on limited grounds.  The High Court limited the appeal 
to the argument that the Court of Appeal had erred in finding that any act or omission of the 
appellants had caused the malignant pleural mesothelioma by failing to correct, or by approving, the 
Tribunal’s decision that causation could be established by an increase in risk and its reliance upon 
insufficient expert opinion evidence in respect of causation.4 
 
 
High Court decision 
On 14 December 2011, the High Court handed down its decision in Amaca Pty Limited (Under NSW 
Administered Winding Up) v Booth; Amaba Pty Limited (Under NSW Administered Winding Up) v 
Booth [2011] HCA 53, a majority dismissing the appeal. 
 
The appellants argued that the evidence of the expert medical witnesses did not support the 
cumulative theory accepted by the trial judge.  It was alleged that the effect of the expert evidence 
was that ‘while various exposures to asbestos had been shown by reference to what occurs across 
populations to increase the cumulative risk of development of mesothelioma, it was not possible to 
say which exposures in fact made a material contribution to its development or when or why’ (at 
[37]).  The appellants also argued that the trial judge’s finding that Amaca Pty Ltd was responsible 
for 10 per cent of the respondent’s ‘additional fibre burden beyond background’ and that Amaba Pty 
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Ltd was responsible for 20 per cent meant that causation had been made out by a small increase in 
risk (at [39]).   
 
At [41] French CJ stated that ‘[c]ausation in tort is not established merely because the allegedly 
tortious act or omission increased the risk of injury’.5  His Honour then went on to examine the 
relationship between risk and causation.  At [43] he explained: 
 
The existence of an association or a positive statistical correlation between the occurrence 
of one event and the subsequent occurrence of another may be expressed as a possibility, 
which may be no greater than a ‘real chance’ that, if the first event occurs, the second event 
will also occur. The mere existence of such an association or correlation does not justify a 
statement, relevant to factual causation in law, that the first event ‘creates’ or ‘gives rise to’ 
or ‘increases’ the probability that the second event will occur. Such a statement contains an 
assumption that if the second event occurs it will have some causal connection to the first. 
However, if the association between two events is shown to have a causal explanation, then 
the conclusion may be open, if the second event should occur, that the first event has been 
at least a contributing cause of that occurrence. An after-the-event inference of causal 
connection may be reached on the civil standard of proof, namely, balance of probabilities, 
notwithstanding that the statistical correlation between the first event and the second event 
indicated, prospectively, no more than a ‘mere possibility’ or ‘real chance’ that the second 
event would occur given the first event.  
 
The epidemiological data demonstrated conclusively that chrysotile has the capacity to induce 
pleural malignant mesothelioma, but it did not specifically identify brake lining workers versus 
general automotive mechanics.  However, by analogy, exposure to dust derived from brake linings 
containing chrysotile asbestos could on the balance of probabilities induce mesothelioma (at [46]).  
At [49] French CJ held that a causal connection could be inferred by an expert in the field, that is a 
causal connection between the conduct and the injury and: 
  
Where the existence of a causal connection is accepted it can support an inference, in the 
particular case, when injury has eventuated, that the defendant's conduct was a cause of the 
injury. 
 
Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ delivered a joint judgment.  After reviewing the expert evidence, 
their Honours held at [90] that it was open for the trial judge to decide that he was ‘not persuaded 
that the epidemiological evidence specific to automotive mechanics is adverse to the submission 
that causation has been proved in this particular case’.6  At [88] it states: 
 
The epidemiological evidence, considered by itself, did leave open the inference that 
cumulative exposure to asbestos increased the risk of contracting mesothelioma by 
developing bodily processes to an irreversible point. Further, as Dr Leigh emphasised in his 
report, inability to demonstrate epidemiologically a statistically significant increase in risk in 
motor mechanics, relative to other occupational categories, does not, in any way, negate a 
causal inference in an individual case where, beyond the general background environment, 
the only asbestos exposure was incurred in that occupation. 
 
Heydon J gave a dissenting judgment.  His Honour noted the various sources of asbestos to which 
the respondent had been exposed in his lifetime.  To prove causation his Honour noted at [103] that 
the respondent had to establish that exposure to asbestos before his work as a mechanic ‘had not 
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caused the irreversible changes in his body which led him later to display the symptoms of 
mesothelioma’ and that ‘some of the fibres to which he was exposed as a brake repairer were 
Amaca fibres (as distinct from the fibres of other brake manufacturers), and that they caused those 
changes in his body’.  Reviewing the evidence, Heydon J at [139] concluded: 
 
while there was evidence that examining what happened across populations revealed that a 
succession of exposures to asbestos increased the cumulative risk of suffering mesothelioma 
both for the populations as a whole and for individuals within them, the evidence did not 
show that in the case of a particular individual like the plaintiff it could be said that all 
exposure to chrysotile asbestos materially contributed to his mesothelioma. Each exposure 
increased his risk of developing mesothelioma. It does not follow that each exposure caused 
the mesothelioma. With respect, the Court of Appeal misunderstood the expert evidence by 
accepting the snippets of it quoted by the trial judge as representative, and by accepting the 
trial judge's characterisation of it as correct. 
 
Heydon J agreed with the appellants’ proposition that the trial judge was incorrect to consider that 
an ‘overwhelming inference of causation may be drawn’ could be drawn from the facts.7  The 
evidence before the Tribunal did not discriminate between exposure to asbestos by the appellants’ 
products and brake linings of other manufacturers, nor did it justify a conclusion that it was more 
probable than not that changes occurred to the respondent’s body to lead to mesothelioma after 
exposure commencing work as a mechanic (at [146]).  His Honour also noted that the trial judge had 
failed to consider the ‘but for test’ – ‘a necessary but not sufficient test for causation’ (at [149]).8  
Evidence had been given that the inhalation of asbestos from the brake linings did not satisfy the 
‘but for’ test. 
 
UK decisions 
Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd,9 a leading English case on causation also concerning 
mesothelioma, was decided in 2002.  Fairchild raised the issue of whether causation could be 
established if an employee had been exposed to asbestos by different employers and could not on 
the balance of probabilities establish whether it was the breach of a particular employer or all 
employers which caused the employee’s mesothelioma.  The House of Lords held that in such 
circumstances the employee could recover damages from both employers and this approach was 
consistent with principle and it would be ‘contrary to principle to insist on application of a rule which 
appeared, if it did, to yield unfair results’.10  The decision of Fairchild was affirmed in Sienkiewicz v 
Greif (UK) Ltd; Willmore v Knowsley Metropolitan Borough Council, but it was recognised that 
causation was a ‘special rule’: 
 
The special rule of causation applied to mesothelioma was devised because of ignorance 
about the biological cause of the disease. It was accepted in Fairchild’s case and Barker’s 
case [2006] 3 All ER 785, [2006] 2 AC 572 that this rendered it impossible for a claimant to 
prove causation according to the conventional ‘but for’ test and this caused injustice to 
claimants.11 
 
The majority decisions of Booth refer to Fairchild but distinguish it as a ‘special rule’.  French CJ at 
[52] stated that Fairchild was a ‘modified concept of causation’ creating a new head of tortious 
liability.  Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ noted at [80]-[81] that the medical knowledge at the time 
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of Fairchild supported the theory that a single fibre could cause mesothelioma and there was a lack 
of detailed evidence in the case. This, combined with the fact that legislation is now in place to 
supplement the common law in England,12 meant that the evidentiary foundation required in Booth 
was different.    
 
Conclusion 
It has been accepted that any exposure to asbestos beyond what was referred to as the ‘background 
risk’ or ‘background level’ (that which occur in the general environment), is capable of leading to the 
development of mesothelioma.  The decision of the High Court increases the difficulty for a 
defendant to argue lack of causation, even if they are responsible for low amounts of asbestos, in a 
case where the plaintiff has been exposed to the material from a variety of sources.  Policy was not 
relied upon by the High Court in Booth to justify a finding of causation, but it affirmed that evidence 
of cumulative exposure to asbestos may be sufficient to establish causation if there is no other 
significant competing risk.  For example, in Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis13the plaintiff failed to prove that on 
the balance of probabilities it was the exposure to asbestos rather than his smoking habit which had 
caused his lung disease.  
 
Perhaps it is time for legislative intervention.  As Heydon J stated at [93]: 
 
The extent of exposure to asbestos amongst those now living, the likely exposure amongst 
those yet to be born, and the likelihood of further injury taking place when asbestos is 
removed from the many places where it is now found, mean that problems of the kind 
thrown up in these appeals will remain for decades to come. Perhaps a social-medical 
problem of this size requires a legislative solution. 
 
Amanda Stickley 
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